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The large and growing proportion of U.S. students who come from poverty backgrounds explains 
this country’s relatively low performance on international achievement tests. These students 
need a broad range of comprehensive educational services if they are to have a meaningful 
opportunity to succeed in school. These opportunities include not only adequate resources for 
basic K–12 educational services but also parent engagement, health and other services, and 
additional early education, after-school, and summer programs. In most states, the schools 
attended by students with the greatest needs tend to receive the fewest resources because of the 
inequitable systems most states use for financing public education. 
The United States’ critical educational goals cannot be met unless the courts undertake a 
more active, sustained role in establishing a constitutional right to comprehensive educational 
opportunity and in pressing states to provide the schools sufficient resources to provide all 
students meaningful educational opportunities. The courts can effectively undertake this role, in 
a manner that is consistent with constitutional separation of powers requirements, by focusing 
on the comparative institutional strengths of each of the three branches of government. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The large and growing proportion of U.S. students who come from poverty backgrounds is a 
major explanation for this country’s relatively low performance on international achievement 
tests.
1
 The United States has a larger percentage of students from poverty backgrounds than 
virtually every other advanced European, Asian, or North American country.
2
 The fact that so 
many U.S. students enter school with the large range of disadvantages that stem from poverty 
also explains the failure of most U.S. schools to even come close to reaching the proficiency 
targets established a dozen years ago by the federal No Child Left Behind Act.
3
 This substandard 
educational performance threatens this country’s ability to compete in the global economy, as 
well as the continued viability of our democratic political system. 
The impact of poverty on children’s learning is profound and multidimensional. Children 
who grow up in poverty are much more likely than other children to experience conditions that 
make learning difficult and put them at risk for academic failure.
4
 Moreover, the longer a child is 
poor, the more extreme the poverty, the greater the concentration of poverty in the child’s 
surroundings, and the younger the child, the more serious the effects on the child’s potential to 
succeed academically 
The federal government and virtually all of the states recognize this reality, and they 
proclaim that overcoming the achievement gaps related to poverty and race is the country’s 
principal educational policy. But although they have established ambitious outcome goals and 
hold students and teachers accountable for reaching them, officials in Washington and in most of  
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the states have failed to ensure that the schools have the resources they need to meet these goals. 
This malignant neglect has two separate dimensions: a failure to provide adequate resources for 
basic K–12 education to schools in low-income neighborhoods, and a failure to provide the 
additional early education, health, after-school summer, parent engagement, and other 
comprehensive services that students from poverty backgrounds need to have a meaningful 
opportunity to meet challenging state academic standards. This article discusses each of these 
deficiencies and then asserts that the United States’ critical educational goals cannot be met 
unless the courts have an active and sustained role in pressing policy makers to give the schools 
sufficient resources to provide meaningful educational opportunities to all U.S. students. 
 
Funding Inequities 
In 1991, Jonathan Kozol described in excruciating detail the deprivations that students in low-
income areas in Illinois, New York, New Jersey, and Texas suffered because of the “savage 
inequalities” that existed in the education finance systems in those states and in most other parts 
of the country.
5
 Since that time numerous educational reforms have been implemented, but in 
most of the schools in which the children of the poor are enrolled resource deprivations remain 
unremedied and the conditions under which they attempt to learn remain bleak. The prime reason 
for this pattern of deprivation is the inherent inequity that stems from the fact that a majority of 
the funds that support public education historically have been raised through local property taxes. 
This means that children who live in districts with low wealth and low property values—as most 
low-income and most minority students do—will have substantially fewer resources available to 
meet their educational needs. 
Last year, the National Commission on Equity and Excellence in Education found that 
“deep inequities in school funding . . . remain entrenched across our nation’s states and school 
districts at a time when more than 40% of all American school children are enrolled in districts 
of concentrated poverty.”6 The commission found that in most states, the highest-spending 
districts expend about twice as much per pupil as the lowest-spending districts; in some states, 
such as California, the ratio is more than 3-to-1. Even excluding the top 5 percent of districts, 
spending in California in 2009 ranged from $6,032 to $18,025 per pupil.
7
 
To deal with these longstanding and increasingly consequential problems, the 
commission recommended “bold action by the states—and the federal government—to redesign 
and reform the funding of our nation’s public schools.”8 The report calls on all of the states to 
take the following steps: 
 Identify and publicly report the teaching staff, programs and services needed to provide a 
meaningful educational opportunity to all students of every race and income level. 
 Determine and report the actual cost of resources identified as needed to provide all 
students a meaningful educational opportunity based on the efficient and cost-effective 
use of resources. 
 Adopt and implement a school finance system that will provide equitable and sufficient 
funding for all students to achieve state content and performance standards. “Equitable 
funding” includes the provision of additional resources to address the academic and other 
needs of low-income students, students with disabilities and English-language learners, 
and for districts and schools serving large concentrations of low-income students and 
those in remote areas. 
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 Ensure that their respective finance systems are supported by stable and predictable 
sources of revenue. 
 Develop systems to ensure districts and schools effectively and efficiently use all 
education funding to enable students to achieve state content and performance standards.
9
 
In many parts of the country state courts have issued rulings that have pressed for these 
kinds of reforms. The state courts became the locus for these cases because in 1973, in a legal 
challenge to Texas’s education finance system, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to invalidate that 
state’s highly inequitable scheme. Although the high court agreed that Texas’s system was 
inequitable, nevertheless, the justices refused to uphold the plaintiffs’ claims, primarily because 
they determined that education is not a “fundamental interest” under the U.S. Constitution.10 
 Following this major setback in the federal courts, advocates turned to the state courts. 
Over the past forty years, constitutional challenges to state systems for funding public education 
have been litigated in the courts of forty-five of the fifty states. Shortly after the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued its decision in Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court held that even if education 
is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution, it clearly is so under the California 
constitution.
11
 Soon thereafter, courts in states such as New Jersey, Connecticut, and West 
Virginia also declared their state education finance systems unconstitutional. Plaintiffs’ fortunes 
in these cases have waxed and waned, but overall they have prevailed in approximately 60 
percent of the rulings of the highest state courts.
12
 
The courts’ intervention in education finance matters has resulted in significant increases 
in the adequacy of educational funding and the equity of resource distributions in many states. In 
Kentucky, for example, litigation resulted in dramatic reductions in spending disparities among 
school districts, the redesign and reform of the entire education system, and a significant increase 
in that state’s student achievement scores.13 In Massachusetts, enactment of the Education 
Reform Act of 1993 in response to that state’s adequacy litigation also sharply reduced the 
funding gaps between rich and poor school districts,
14
 and the percentage of students achieving 
proficiency on state tests has risen dramatically.
15
 Decades of litigation in New Jersey on behalf 
of the largely minority, low-income students in thirty-one urban districts has resulted in 
significant increases in their achievement test scores;
16
 one of these districts, Union City, a 92 
percent Latino district that is the poorest in the state, has effectively closed the achievement gap 
between its students and non-urban students, and it may be the first urban district in the United 
States to sustain academic achievement into the middle grades.
17
 
In other instances, though, strong resistance from the governor or the legislature or both 
has delayed or impeded mandated reforms. In Ohio, for example, the legislature had partially 
responded to a series of court orders by, among other things, reducing funding inequities and 
improving school facilities following the declaration of unconstitutionality. The legislature’s 
failure to implement fully the judicial orders, however, and the judges’ unwillingness to confront 
the legislature led the state supreme court to retreat from the fray and terminate the cases before 
an appropriate remedy had been effectuated.
18
 In West Virginia, the legislature virtually ignored 
the courts’ extensive orders throughout the 1980s but then implemented some more limited 
reforms after another follow-up litigation was initiated in the mid-1990s.
19
 In Alabama, after a 
change in its membership following an election, the court sua sponte reopened Alabama 
Coalition for Equity v. Spiegelman,
20
 a case it had decided for the plaintiffs in 1993, and after 
soliciting arguments from the two sides, dismissed the case, citing separation of powers and 
justiciability concerns.
21
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Overall, then, despite Rodriguez’s closing of the federal courts to fiscal equity and 
educational adequacy litigations in 1973, progress has been made toward overcoming inequities 
in the funding of public education in the decades since because of the willingness of many state 
courts to pick up the mantle in this area. Twenty-seven state courts have issued rulings that have 
attempted to promote meaningful educational opportunities, especially for low-income and 
minority students. Courts in nineteen other states, however, have refused to accept jurisdiction or 
have otherwise found for the defendants, and in five other states no litigations have been 
initiated. And although the remedies issued by the states where the plaintiffs have prevailed have 
resulted in increased equity and improvements in educational opportunities and educational 
achievement, some of the state court remedies have not proven successful. 
 
Need for Comprehensive Services 
Efforts to overcome the achievement gaps that largely stem from students’ poverty backgrounds 
are not succeeding at an acceptable pace because the reform efforts do not match the enormity of 
the problem. The escalating proportion of students from low-income households in our schools 
and the abundant evidence of the impact of poverty on their readiness for school success require 
a much more extensive and comprehensive approach to educational equity than the United States 
has mounted to date. 
The impact of poverty on children’s readiness to learn is profound. Children from low-
income households are more likely to be exposed to lead dust and poisoning, vision and hearing 
problems, untreated cavities, and asthma, all of which directly relate to capacity for learning. For 
example, lead exposure is connected with lowered IQ scores.
22
 Children spend, on average, a 
thousand hours a year in school but five thousand hours in the neighborhood and with their 
families.
23
 This means that if we seek to deal effectively with the impediments to learning that 
surround children from poverty backgrounds, we must provide them a broad range of 
“supplementary educational interventions” during their nonschool hours.24 Such services should 
include early childhood education programs, after-school and summer programs, family and 
community support, health, and nutrition.
25
 Unless we attend to these broad needs, we will never 
overcome the significant achievement gaps between low-income and minority students and their 
more advantaged peers. 
Because out-of-school factors directly impede academic achievement, they can no longer 
be relegated to the sidelines of the education policy dialogue; they must be tackled head on. The 
potential benefits of providing such comprehensive supports and services have long been 
recognized. In the nineteenth century, the settlement houses were an early model for providing a 
variety of services to children and their families. The 1960s’ War on Poverty expanded programs 
for children, although it left them largely uncoordinated. Spurred by research in the social 
sciences in the 1970s and 1980s, a widespread understanding emerged of the benefits of the 
coordinated delivery of a wide range of health, mental health, family, and educational services to 
children. 
In recent years, we have seen a burgeoning of initiatives, programs, projects, and 
activities that seek to integrate education and supports. The delivery models employed include 
full-service community schools, promising neighborhood initiatives modeled on the Harlem 
Children’s Zone, citywide or county-wide collective impact projects such as Say Yes Syracuse 
and Strive Cincinnati, and a variety of other collective impact initiatives. 
Although the importance of taking a comprehensive approach to the well-being of 
children has, therefore, been widely recognized, efforts to date have not been effectively 
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coordinated or extended on the systematic, statewide basis that is necessary to provide 
meaningful educational opportunities for all children. The successful models of coordinated 
comprehensive services have not been sufficiently publicized, replicated, funded, and brought to 
scale. If we are to meet the nation’s stated goals for educational opportunity and educational 
achievement, we need to vastly expand our understanding of, and advocacy for, effective 
mechanisms for providing comprehensive educational equity. 
Ironically, however, despite the enormity of the deprivations suffered by children from 
poverty backgrounds and the magnitude of their learning needs, in the United States today the 
children with the greatest needs by and large have the fewest resources provided to them. 
Although the legal challenges to this pattern of inequity triggered a vigorous debate over the past 
few decades about whether “money matters” in education, the overwhelming consensus of the 
research and of the many judicial decisions that have considered this question is that money does 
matter—if it is spent well.26 The real issue, then, is not whether additional funding for 
comprehensive services is necessary but what steps need to be taken to ensure that funds 
appropriated for this purpose are used in an efficient and cost-effective manner. 
Funding for public education, however, is not and cannot be unlimited. Therefore, money 
that is appropriated for school-based services and for critical supplementary services must be 
spent in ways that are strategic and accountable. The provision of services in each of the 
comprehensive educational opportunity areas needs to be approached through careful cost-
benefit analyses of likely gains and with continuing oversight of the effectiveness of the methods 
of delivering the particular services. The critical concerns should be (a) how do we get better 
results for present investments and (b) what new investments are most likely to yield the greatest 
long-range educational gains. The kinds of cost-benefit studies undertaken by Levin and Belfield 
need to be replicated and expanded, and future-cost studies for determining legislative 
appropriations for in-school and out-of school educational services need to be correlated with 
analyses of best practices and most promising practices in particular areas of education.
27
 
Some may ask, why take this comprehensive approach when a number of studies point to 
high-poverty, high-minority schools that are “beating the odds” and distinguishing themselves 
with good outcomes thanks to high-quality teaching and great leadership? The goal, however, 
must go beyond helping some schools to beat the odds against success; we must aim to lower 
those odds for all schools. We need to study the broad range of factors that have contributed to 
success in particular initiatives and determine the extent to which these practices are replicable 
and can be implemented on a larger scale and for sustained periods. 
If these comprehensive services are to be provided on the scale and in the sustained 
manner that is needed to truly meet the needs of the growing number of children from poverty 
backgrounds in our schools, disadvantaged students’ access to the necessary comprehensive 
services needs to be seen as a basic right rather than as a discretionary benefit that policymakers 
may bestow or deny. A strong case can be made on both statutory and constitutional grounds for 
establishing such a right.
28
 Doing so will focus attention on the critical link between poverty and 
achievement gaps and will require the government to provide the full range of resources 
necessary to meet the urgent needs of children from backgrounds of poverty. 
 
The Necessary Role of the Courts 
If meaningful educational opportunity for all children is to be achieved, the courts must not only 
articulate a right to comprehensive educational opportunity, but they must also effectively 
enforce that right. After all, contemporary understandings of equal educational opportunity were 
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largely created by Brown v. Board of Education and shaped by the series of federal 
desegregation and related education cases that followed in its wake.
29
 The state court fiscal 
equity and education adequacy litigations have maintained and magnified the egalitarian 
momentum, even as the federal courts’ active pursuit of school desegregation has abated, and 
they have begun to define in concrete terms the elements of meaningful educational opportunity, 
including the comprehensive services discussed in the previous section. 
But as the federal courts’ retrenchment in enforcing school desegregation and the state 
courts’ inconsistent follow-through in the remedial stage of many of the state court education 
finance cases demonstrate, the courts’ involvement in education policy litigations has not 
consistently realized its potential for promoting positive educational reform. One of the major 
reasons for delay and resistance to constitutional mandates in these cases is that many 
policymakers and many judges are reluctant to understand and acknowledge the importance of 
the courts’ role in educational reform. Opponents attack the legitimacy of the court’s 
involvement, claiming that it is a usurpation of legislative and executive authority, and they 
claim that the courts lack institutional capacity to effectively promote necessary reforms.
30
 These 
charges of judicial usurpation and institutional incapacity, which originated with political 
opposition to the desegregation decrees of the federal courts in the 1960s and 1970s and have 
been repeated as a mantra ever since, have little doctrinal or empirical substance. 
Abram Chayes confronted these objections in a major article he wrote in 1976 that 
describes in detail the “new model” of public law litigation and relates the growth of the judicial 
involvement in the reform of public institutions since Brown to the broader expansion of 
governmental activities in the welfare state era.
31
 Malcolm Feeley and Edwin Rubin, agreeing 
with this perspective, put it this way: 
[Judges] are part of the modern administrative state. . . . And they fulfill their role 
within that context. Under certain circumstances that role involves public policy 
makings; as our state has become increasingly administrative and managerial, 
judicial policy-making has become both more necessary for judges to produce 
effects and more legitimate as a general model of governmental action.
32
 
That the courts’ expanded role is a fundamental judicial reaction to deep-rooted social 
and political trends seems to be borne out by the fact that the activist stance initiated during the 
Warren Court era has persisted to a large extent through the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts 
years, and that conservatives no less than liberals now tend to look to the courts routinely to 
remedy legislative or executive actions of which they disapprove. 
In the 1980s, my colleague Arthur R. Block and I undertook two major empirical studies 
to test the validity of the competing arguments in the judicial activism debate in actual instances 
of educational policymaking by courts, legislatures, and a major administrative agency, the 
Office of Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
33
 We 
concluded, among other things, that the evidentiary records accumulated in the court cases were 
more complete and had more influence on the actual decision-making process than did the 
factual data obtained through legislative hearings. The latter tended to be “window dressing” 
occasions organized to justify political decisions that had already been made.
34
 Our study also 
found that judicial remedial involvement in school district affairs was less intrusive and more 
competent than is generally assumed, largely because school districts and a variety of experts 
generally participated in the formulation of reform decrees, with the courts serving as catalysts 
and mediators. The courts’ “staying power” and their ability to respond flexibly to changed 
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circumstances was also markedly more effective than that of the legislatures and the 
administrative agency.
35
 
The irony of the fact that some political commentators and academics continue to invoke 
anachronistic “judicial activism” phrases is that, while these pundits persist in arguing that the 
courts’ new role is usurping legislative powers, Congress and the state legislatures have 
themselves asked the courts to take on more of these policymaking activities by passing 
regulatory statutes that directly or implicitly call for expanded judicial review. A prime example 
is the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, in which Congress set forth a detailed set of 
substantive and procedural rights and established a new area of court jurisdiction for individual 
suits, regardless of the amount in controversy.
36
 Under these circumstances, as Chayes aptly puts 
it, we should “concentrate not on turning the clock back (or off), but on improving the 
performance of public law litigation.”37 
One of the major fallacies of those who argue that courts lack the institutional capacity to 
deal with complex social policy issues is that they focus on the limitations of the judicial branch, 
while ignoring the comparable institutional shortcomings of the legislative and the executive 
branches. For example, Donald Horowitz, one of the foremost critics of the courts’ new role, 
catalogued a bevy of examples of alleged judicial incompetence, ranging from receiving 
information in a skewed and halting fashion to failing to understand the social context and 
potential unintended consequences of the cases before them.
38
 As Neil Komesar has forcefully 
pointed out, however, Horowitz’s critique, like that of many of his current disciples, was 
unreasonably one-sided: 
Horowitz’s study can do no more than force us to accept the reality of judicial 
imperfection. By its own terms it is not comparative, and that is far more damning 
than Horowitz supposes. All societal decision makers are highly imperfect. Were 
Horowitz to turn his critical eye to administrative agencies or legislatures he 
would no doubt find problems with expertise, access to information, 
characterization of issues, and follow-up. Careful studies would undoubtedly 
reveal important instances of awkwardness, error and deleterious effect.
39
 
In the state-court educational equity and adequacy cases, among the main criticisms of 
judicial intervention are that the courts have failed to “require[e] the efficient or cost-effective 
use of funds,”40 that they assumed that “school districts are organized in a way that ensures that 
they are making productive use of the money they now receive from taxpayers or of the 
additional money they would receive if adequacy campaigns prevailed.”41 As Komesar points 
out, however, none of these critics has even claimed that the other branches of government have 
been more effective than the courts in ensuring the productive use of educational funding. 
The fact is that providing meaningful educational opportunities to eliminate or 
substantially narrow achievement gaps is a daunting task that no governmental entity has been 
able to solve. If Brown’s vision of equal educational opportunity is actually to be realized, it will 
require the sustained commitment of all three branches of government, at the federal and state 
levels, working collaboratively in dramatic new ways. In the complex administrative 
environment in which we now live, no single institution, whether a legislature, an administrative 
agency, or a court, can successfully resolve major social problems. Effective policymaking in a 
complex regulatory environment requires continuing interchanges and often continuing 
involvement of all three branches of government. Successful implementation of meaningful 
educational opportunity has generally occurred in the past when the judicial, legislative, and 
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executive branches worked collaboratively together, as in Congress’s advancing the 
desegregation remedies formulated by the courts through the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act and Title VI statutes,
42
 and in Congress’s enactment of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act.
43
 
In considering the role of the courts in promoting meaningful educational opportunities, 
the approach should be, not repetition of abstract rhetoric about judicial “usurpation,” but 
consideration from a comparative institutional perspective of what functions courts can best 
undertake, in collaboration with the other branches, to promote effective school reform practices. 
What is needed, therefore, is not a competition but a “colloquy” 44 among the branches to get this 
demanding job done. Such a colloquy should build on the realization that each of the three 
branches has specific institutional strengths and weaknesses in regard to social policy making 
and remedial problem solving. The focus therefore should be on how the strengths of each of the 
branches can best be jointly brought to bear on solving critical social problems. 
Although a full consideration of which functions can best be undertaken by the courts, by 
legislatures, and by executive agencies will require substantially more dialogue and 
consideration than can be dealt with in this article, a few preliminary illustrative points about the 
courts’ comparative institutional strengths are apparent. First, declaring and insisting on the 
vindication of constitutional rights is the courts’ prime constitutional responsibility. The courts’ 
role in articulating constitutional principles and affirming the right of all children to an adequate, 
meaningful, and comprehensive educational opportunity is of paramount importance. The 
concept of equal educational opportunity that has been at the core of political and legal advances 
for the past fifty years would not have occurred without the Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
in Brown, nor would education finance reform and an insistence that poor and minority children 
be provided the resources they need to have a meaningful educational opportunity have occurred 
without the intervention of the state courts. Full realization of these values through the 
establishment of a right to comprehensive educational opportunity also will not come about 
without the continued active involvement of the courts. 
Second, because state legislatures and executive agencies overseeing school districts have 
at times failed to ensure the effective use of education funds, courts need to become more, not 
less, active at the remedy stage of equal opportunity and adequacy litigations. As noted earlier, 
virtually all the economists and fiscal policy analysts agree that money matters in education—if 
the money is spent well. Ensuring accountability and the effective use of funds is a function for 
which the courts are particularly well suited. State courts have proved to be highly adept at 
promoting and reviewing cost studies that provide proper parameters for adequate funding. This 
does not mean that courts should undertake cost studies or devise the econometric methodologies 
that should be used in such studies. These functions are better undertaken by the other branches. 
Rather, judicial review is important in the costing-out process in providing a neutral forum for 
reviewing the validity of legislative or executive actions when allegations of manipulation or 
misuse of the cost study data arises.
45
 
Courts similarly are well equipped to review and enforce effective accountability 
measures to ensure that the manner in which education funds stemming from adequacy cases are 
used is cost-efficient, productive, and targeted. Ironically, opponents of judicial involvement in 
education adequacy cases rebuke the courts for mandating sizeable increases in education 
funding without taking any steps to ensure that the money is actually spent effectively. But, at 
the same time, they argue that the courts must terminate their involvement in these litigations as 
soon as possible. The fact is that courts have a unique capacity to ensure that effective 
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accountability measures are put into effect, not by micromanaging the day-to-day operations of a 
school system, but in making sure that state education departments and school districts do their 
jobs well. 
Because the challenge of meeting the needs of students from poverty backgrounds 
requires a broad, comprehensive range of meaningful educational opportunities, the courts must 
play a central role in articulating the constitutional principles involved and in overseeing the 
remedies to make sure that the solutions the legislatures and state education agencies devise are 
appropriate, and that they are fully and fairly implemented. 
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